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7.1  Introduction 
The East Asian crisis of  1997-98  has generated a stream of stunning 
news about bankruptcies, dwindling international reserves, weak banks, 
and plunging currencies. In the midst of this ever growing debacle, many 
observers have been surprised by  Latin America’s resilience and by  the 
absence of a major contagion effect into the region. Some private sector 
analysts have argued that Latin America’s insulation from the Asian crisis 
has been the result of the major reforms implemented in the region in the 
last decade or sb. Since these reforms have created a lean productive struc- 
ture,  the argument goes, Latin America will  continue to receive a sub- 
stantial flow of capital from abroad. This view is nicely captured by  the 
following quote from ING Barings (1998, 64): “The general resilience of 
Latin America to a more difficult global economic backdrop has much to 
do with . . . an improving microeconomic base. The region has benefited 
from strong liquidity flows (both FDI and portfolio capital).” And accord- 
ing to Santander Investment (1998,5-6),  “regional economies should con- 
tinue to perform well  . . . capital flows in  1998, however, will  be a key 
variable . . . privatization related capital flows . . . should continue going 
into the region this year, with portfolio inflows trailing off amid prevailing 
market instability.” Although other observers are less sanguine, they agree 
on the important role of capital inflows in determining the region’s eco- 
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nomic future. For example, according to Goldman Sachs (1998, 5), “the 
global financial shocks affecting Asia . . . forced us to downgrade signifi- 
cantly the economic outlook for Latin America in 1998. This is so because 
[of] lower capital inflows . . . [and] higher bond spreads.” This dependence 
on capital flows is not new.  Even a cursory analysis of Latin America’s 
economic history in the second half of this century would show that capi- 
tal flows-both  their  level and volatility-have  greatly affected the re- 
gion’s performance. 
Mexico’s experience during the last twenty years captures in a nutshell 
the story of the Latin American region. After facing a serious external 
crisis in the early 1980s, Mexico embarked on ambitious reforms aimed at 
modernizing its economy during the late 1980s. The country was opened 
to international competition, a massive privatization process was under- 
taken, and most economic transactions were deregulated. Largely as a re- 
sult of these reforms the international financial community rediscovered 
Mexico in the early 1990s, and a significant volume of capital started flow- 
ing into the country. 
The Mexican currency  crisis of  December  1994, however, generated 
considerable anxiety among policy analysts, financial operators, and in- 
ternational civil servants. Some asked whether Latin America was indeed 
ready to adopt market-oriented policies, while others questioned the ap- 
propriateness of specific policies, including the use of a rigid nominal ex- 
change rate as a way to reduce inflation. The behavior of capital inflows has 
been at the center of almost every analysis of the Mexican crisis. Some au- 
thors have argued that massive flows allowed Mexico to increase consump- 
tion in qite of weak fundamentals. According  to others, the predomi- 
nantly “speculative” nature of these flows signaled, from early on, that the 
Mexican experience was bound to run into a serious external crisis. Yet 
others argued that Mexico’s mistake was to have lifted capital controls too 
early, allowing these “speculative” flows to disturb the country’s macro- 
economic foundations. According  to these analysts a more appropriate 
policy stance in Mexico would have been to maintain some form of capital 
controls, as a number of emerging economies-including  Chile, Colom- 
bia, and Israel, among others-have  done for some time. The proponents 
of this view argue that capital controls will isolate these young economies 
from volatile short-run capital flows, helping them reduce their overall 
degree of vulnerability to external shocks, including speculative attacks.’ 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss some of the most important 
aspects of Latin America’s experience with capital flows. The paper is or- 
ganized as follows: In section 7.2 I discuss, from a historical perspective, 
1. On the Mexican crisis, see, eg,  Dornbush and Werner (1994), Dornbusch, Goldfajn, 
and Valdes (1995), Bruno (1995), and Calvo and Mendoza (1996). On the benefits and costs 
of capital controls, see, e.g., the essays collected in Edwards (1995b). Capital Flows, Real Exchange Rates, and Capital Controls  199 
Latin America’s experience with capital flows during the last twenty-five 
years. In section 7.3 I discuss, within the context of  the sequencing of 
reform literature, the relationship between  capital flows,  real exchange 
rates, and international competitiveness. Section 7.4 focuses on the role of 
capital controls as a device for isolating emerging economies from the 
volatility of international capital markets. I begin by reviewing the policy 
issues and the current debate on the subject. I then present an empirical 
analysis of  Chile’s recent experiences with capital controls, and I make 
some comparisons to the recent experiences of Colombia. The analysis 
of  the Chilean experience is particularly important since its practice of 
imposing reserves requirements on capital inflows has been praised by  a 
number of analysts, including senior staff of the multilateral institutions, 
as an effective and efficient way  of reducing the vulnerability associated 
with capital flows volatility. Section 7.5 presents my  conclusions. In that 
section I also provide some reflections, based on recent Latin American 
historical episodes, on the role of banks in intermediating capital inflows 
and on financial crises.2 
7.2  Twenty-Five Years of Capital Flows to Latin America 
7.2.1  Capital Hunger in the 1970s 
During the 1960s and early 1970s Latin America was basically cut off 
from private international financial markets3  With the exception of lim- 
ited amounts of foreign direct investment (FDI), very little private capital 
moved into the region. Throughout this period Latin America relied on 
official capital flows-largely  from the World Bank, the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IADB), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
In a way, the region was the captive customer of the multilateral institu- 
tions. During this period, and following the then-dominant “two gaps” ap- 
proach to economic development, most analysts believed that an increase 
in the availability of foreign financing would allow the region to relax the 
“foreign constraint” and accelerate the rate of growth (Eaton 1989). 
In the mid- and late  197Os, and largely as the result of the oil price 
shocks, international  private liquidity increased significantly, and Latin 
America became a major  recipient of  recycled  “petrodollars.” In 198  1 
alone the region received (net) private capital inflows in excess of 21 per- 
2. It is important to stress at the outset that Latin America is an extremely diverse region 
with sophisticated as well as backward economies, with large and very small countries, and 
with stable and volatile economic systems. This means that broad generalizations are bound 
to be misleading and to provide oversimplified views of the region. For this reason, then, in 
this paper I make an effort to make distinctions across countries as well as to discuss broad 
regional trends. 
3. Parts of this section draw on Edwards (1999). 200  Sebastian Edwards 
cent of exports. Individual country cases, however, differed significantly 
during this period. While in Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela a majority of 
these flows were captured by  the government and were used to finance 
large (and increasing) fiscal deficits, in Argentina and Chile-two  nations 
embarked at the time on early market-oriented reforms-they  were largely 
channeled to the private ~ector.~ 
7.2.2  The Debt Crisis and the Lost Decade 
During 1979-81,  and in spite of major commodity price shocks, most 
countries in Latin America continued to grow at healthy rates, and a hand- 
ful of them in the Southern Cone were even experimenting with market- 
oriented reforms. What most observers missed at the time-as  they would 
again a dozen years later in Mexico-was  that in most countries three 
worrisome developments were  taking place:  (I) real  exchange rates  be- 
came significantly overvalued, seriously hurting exports’ competitiveness; 
(2) domestic saving remained flat, at rates inconsistent with sustainable 
rapid growth; and (3) a large proportion of the capital inflows were being 
used to finance consumption or investment projects of doubtful quality. 
Most of these funds were intermediated by banks that were subject to little 
supervision, which quickly became the Achilles’ heel of these economie~.~ 
In August 1982, Mexico’s Finance Minister Jesus Silva Herzog informed 
a stunned international community that his country was not able to meet 
its financial obligations. In late 1982 and early 1983, country after country 
saw the access to international financial capital markets disappear. Even 
Chile and Colombia, two countries that played by  the rules of the game 
and did not attempt to reschedule their debts, experienced a drying up of 
private international financing. They were subject to what Ocampo (1989) 
has called the Latin “neighborhood effect.” 
Between 1982 and 1989 most of the Latin American nations muddled 
through, while they tried to negotiate debt reduction deals with their pri- 
vate creditors. The initial reaction by the creditor countries was that the 
debt crisis represented a temporary liquidity problem that could be solved 
with  a combination  of  macroeconomics  adjustment, debt rescheduling 
agreements, and some structural reforms. Two years after the eruption of 
the crisis, optimism had returned to the creditor countries. The IMF World 
Economic Outlook, 1984 and the World Bank’s World Development Report, 
1984 included optimistic projections,  predicting a steady decline of the 
debt/export ratio in the Latin American countries until 1990. The facts, 
however, proved both institutions wrong. By  1987, five years into the crisis, 
4. On the behavior of the Latin American  economies during this period, see, e.g.,  Ed- 
wards (1995a). 
5. Naturally, since funds are fungible it is very difficult to know exactly how the capital 
inflows were finally used. The above description, however, is an accurate picture of the eco- 
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it was becoming increasingly clear even to the most recalcitrant observers 
that the debt burden had greatly reduced the incentives for reforming the 
region’s economies. Between  1985 and 1987 net resource transfers-de- 
fined as net capital inflows minus interest and dividends payments to the 
rest of the world-were  significantly negative, averaging almost 28 percent 
of exports. 
In March  1989, the creditor nations and the multilateral  institutions 
recognized that, in  many cases, it was in everyone’s interest  to provide 
(some) debt forgiveness. This approach was based  on the idea that  for 
highly indebted countries partial  debt forgiveness would encourage the 
type of market-oriented reform conducive to higher exports and faster 
growth. Higher growth, in turn, would allow them to accelerate the pay- 
ment of the (remaining) debt. In March of that year, U.S. Secretary of the 
Treasury Nicholas Brady announced a new initiative based on voluntary 
debt reduction. This basic proposal amounted to exchanging old debt for 
new long-term debt, with a lower face value. The exact conversion ratios, 
and the detailed characteristics of the new instruments, were to be negoti- 
ated between the debtor countries and their creditors-mostly  U.S. banks. 
In order to make this new  approach feasible and attractive to creditor 
banks, the advanced nations and the multilateral institutions devoted a sub- 
stantial amount of resources-on  the order of US$30 billion-to  guar- 
antee the new “Brady” concessional bonds. Typically, principal payments 
on these new securities were backed by thirty-year zero coupon U.S. trea- 
sury bills, and interest payments were subject to rolling three-year guaran- 
tees. Between  1989 and 1997 Costa Rica, Mexico, Venezuela, Uruguay, 
Argentina, Brazil, and Peru reached  agreements with their  creditors to 
reduce their debt burdens. 
In order to be  eligible for Brady plan  negotiations, countries had to 
show willingness “plus some prior action” to engage in serious market- 
oriented economic reform. This plan was seen as a way of rewarding coun- 
tries truly committed to implementing modernization reforms, and it was 
expected that it would lift the debt overhang burdens associated with ex- 
tremely high payments.  In  1989 Mexico and Costa Rica were the first 
countries within the Brady plan framework to reach broad  agreements 
with their creditors to reduce the value of their debt. Venezuela and Uru- 
guay followed in  1990 and 1991, and Argentina and Brazil signed draft 
agreements in  1992. In 1996 Peru became the latest country to come to 
terms with its creditors within the context of the Brady plan. 
By 1990 the vast majority of the countries in the region had embarked 
on market-oriented reforms. Although programs varied across countries, 
they  exhibited  three  common  components:  (1) The implementation of 
stabilization programs aimed at reducing inflation and generating a sus- 
tainable current account balance. In most countries fiscal retrenchment, 
including major tax reform, were at the core of these programs. (2) The 202  Sebastian Edwards 
opening up of these economies to international competition. While every 
country reduced its trade barriers substantially, the approach toward capi- 
tal account liberalization was very diverse. While in some nations-Mex- 
ico and Argentina, for example-capital  controls were abolished, in others 
such as Brazil, Chile, and Colombia some form of capital controls-es- 
pecially on capital inflows-was  maintained. (3) Major privatization and 
deregulation programs, aimed at reducing the importance of the state in 
economic affairs. As the reforms proceeded, many countries added the 
implementation of social programs targeted to the poor as a fourth com- 
ponent of the new development strategy (Edwards 1995a). 
7.2.3  The World Financial Market’s Rediscovery 
of Latin America in the 1990s 
Starting in 1990 the majority of the Latin American countries were able, 
once again, to attract private capital. By  1992 the net volume of  funds 
had become so large-exceeding  35 percent of the region’s exports-that 
a number of analysts began to talk about Latin America’s “capital inflows 
problem”  (Calvo,  Leiderman,  and  Reinhart  1993;  Edwards  1993). To 
many analysts this sudden change from capital scarcity and negative re- 
source transfers to foreign capital overabundance was surprising and re- 
flected a surge in speculation in international markets. To others, the fact 
that merely a dozen years after a major crisis these countries were able to 
tap the international market reflected the success of the market-oriented 
reforms. If the market is willing to reward these countries with plentiful 
funds, the argument went, it must reflect that the reforms are bearing fruit. 
Figure 7.1 presents the evolution of net total capital flows (in billions of 
dollars) into Latin America during the period  1975-96.  As may be seen, 
the cyclical-almost  paranoid, one could say-nature  of capital inflows 
into Latin America comes out clearly. This figure shows the abundance of 
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most of the 1980s, and the remarkable return to abundance in the last few 
years. The crunch of the 1980s, when the region as a whole was transfer- 
ring (in net terms) almost 30 percent of its exports to the rest of the world, 
was extremely severe. One of the most important features of the new real- 
ity in the 1990s has been the significant decline (in relative terms) of offi- 
cial capital flows-and  in particular funds coming from the multilateral 
institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. The year 1995, however, 
was characterized by  a major jump in net official flows, when as a result 
of the Mexican crisis, the IMF, the World Bank, the IADB, and the US. 
government transferred very large amounts of funds to Mexico. This is a 
vivid reflection of the significant change experienced by official financing 
during the last few years. It has gone from being the most important pro- 
vider-and  in some countries, the sole provider-of  foreign funds, to be- 
ing a provider of stabilizing funds. In a way the multilateral official institu- 
tions have become insurance companies of sorts, whose main role is to 
provide relief when a bad state of nature occurs. 
Figure 7.2 presents data on net capital inflows for eight selected coun- 
tries. Figure 7.3, on the other hand, contains data on the composition of 
capital inflows in these Latin American countries for 1975-96. Three types 
of flows are distinguished: (1) foreign direct investment, which reflects, at 
least in principle, a long-term commitment on behalf of the investor in 
the host country: (2) portfolio investment, which includes transactions in 
equity and debt securities; (3) other types of flows, a rather broad category 
that includes trade credit (both long and short term) and official (bilateral 
and multilateral) loans. Several important trends emerge from these fig- 
ures. First, portfolio investment is a relatively new phenomenon in these 
countries. Until the late 198Os, “other” constituted the dominant form of 
inflows in most countries. Second, in some countries portfolio flows were 
by far the dominant form of inflows after 1991. This has particularly been 
the case in Argentina and Mexico. Figure 7.3 also shows that Brazil has 
experienced a tremendous surge in portfolio funds in the last few years. 
These portfolio flows take two basic forms: equities acquisitions-mostly 
in the form of American depositary receipts (ADRs)-by  foreign inves- 
tors, and bond issues in international markets. The World Bank (1997) has 
reported that an increasing number of institutional investors (including 
pension funds) in the advanced countries are adding emerging economies’ 
equities to their portfolios. This heavy reliance on equities and bonds con- 
trasts with the 1970s, when syndicated bank loans constituted the domi- 
nant form of private capital inflows into Latin America. Third, figure 7.3 
shows that the importance of FDI varies significantly across countries. 
Chile, Colombia, and Peru have received particularly  large volumes of 
FDI in the last few years. In all three cases these funds have been largely 
devoted to natural resources-intensive sectors-mining  in Chile and Peru, 
and oil in Colombia. 204  Sebastian Edwards 
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Fig. 7.2  Total net capital flows in selected Latin American countries, 1975-96 
(US$ millions) 
The recent surge in capital inflows-and  in particular of portfolio in- 
flows-to  Latin America has been the result of two basic forces. First, 
developments in international financial conditions, and in particular the 
decline in U.S. interest rates since in 1990-91, have encouraged investors 
in the advanced countries to seek higher returns in other markets, includ- 
ing Latin America. Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993) provided an 
early, and very influential, study of the determinants of capital inflows into 
the region. These authors argue that cyclical external factors have been by 
far the most important determinant of these flows. These results have re- 
cently been confirmed by  the World Bank’s (1997) massive study on pri- 
vate capital inflows to the developing countries. Second, the improvement 
in Latin America’s economic prospects-including  the reduction in coun- 
try  risk  that has been  associated  with  the implementation  of  market- 
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international  investors.  In an extension of  the  Calvo,  Leiderman,  and 
Reinhart (1993) study, Chuhan, Claessens, and Mamingi (1993) found that 
the recipient  country’s own fundamentals were as important as cyclical 
factors in explaining the surge in portfolio flows into Latin America. In a 
recent analysis of the determinants of capital inflows into Chile, Larrain, 
Laban, and Chumacero (1997) argue that while interest rate differentials 
play a key role in determining short-term flows, they are unimportant in 
determining longer ones. These are affected by longer-term structural vari- 
ables, and in particular the country’s impressive market-oriented reforms. 
7.2.4  Policy Issues and Dilemmas in a Volatile Era 
The surge in capital flows in the last few years has raised a number of 
important policy issues. It has been argued, for example, that under capital 
mobility the national authorities lose (some) control over monetary policy, 





-20000~,,  ,  ,  I  ,  ,  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  ,  I  1 







0  DFI  BOTHER -  PORTFO 
ARGENTINA 
,,, I..  ,  .  . 
76  78  80  82  84  86  88  90  92 








76  78  80  82  84  86  88  90  92  94  96 
0DFl  -OTHER  -PORTFO 
CHILE 
Fig. 7.3 
1975-96 (US$ millions) 
Composition of capital flows in selected Latin American countries, 3000 I 
76  78  80  82  84  86  88  90  92  94  96 
0  DFI  BOTHER -  PORTFO 
COLOMBIA 
'76  78  80  82  84  86  88  90  92  94  96 
0  DFI  -OTHER  -PORTFO 
MEXICO 
-2oooJ.  ~  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  I  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  I  I  I 
76  78  80  82  84  86  88  90  92  94  96 
0  DFI  -OTHER  mPORTFO 
PERU 





76  78  80  82  84  86  88  90  92  94  96 
0  DFI  BOTHER  mPORTFO 
URUGUAY 
76  78  80  82  84  86  88  90  92  94  96 
DFI  =OTHER  mPORTFO 
VENEZUELA 
Fig. 7.3  (cont.) 
particular there have been increasing concerns that major reversz in cap- 
ital flows will trigger-as  in East Asia-major  currency collapses. Also, 
policy makers have often expressed concerns over their (effective) freedom 
for selecting the exchange rate regime, if capital is highly mobile. More- 
over, sometimes it has been argued that full capital mobility will result in 
“overborrowing” and, eventually, in a major debt crisis. This preoccupa- 
tion has been heightened in countries with a weak banking system and 
a limited capacity for implementing modern supervisory and regulatory 
systems. The impact of large capital inflows on domestic saving has also 
become an issue of concern among policy makers and analysts. Other con- 
cerns regarding the liberalization of capital movements relate to increased 
real exchange rate instability and potential losses of international competi- Capital Flows, Real Exchange Rates, and Capital Controls  209 
tiveness stemming from real exchange rate appreciations. Still other ana- 
lysts have pointed out that the premature opening of the capital account 
could lead to massive capital flight from the country in question. This 
type of discussion has led to a growing literature on the most adequate 
sequencing and speed of liberalization and stabilization reforms. The ex- 
tent of actual-as  opposed to legal-capital  mobility has been the subject 
of intense policy debate in Latin America. This discussion is directly re- 
lated to the important question of the effectiveness of capital controls, an 
issue I address in some detail in section 7.4 of this paper. 
7.3  The Sequencing of Liberalization, Capital Inflows, 
and Real Exchange Rates 
The increase in capital inflows into Latin American during the first half 
of the 1990s allowed the countries in the region to increase aggregate ex- 
penditure substantially. This generated pressure on domestic prices, large 
real exchange rate appreciations, and, thus, a loss in international compet- 
itiveness. This phenomenon, which has generated concern among academ- 
ics, policy makers, and financial sector operators, has been at the center of 
debates on the appropriate sequencing of economic reform. In particular, 
analysts have asked whether the capital account should be opened (rela- 
tively) early in the liberalization process, or whether its reform should be 
postponed until the reform process has reached a certain level of maturity. 
The academic and policy debate on the sequencing of reform has largely 
been prompted by previous Latin American attempts to open up to inter- 
national competition. This issue was first considered in the 1980s in dis- 
cussions dealing with the Southern Cone’s (Argentina, Chile, and Uru- 
guay) experiences, which emphasized the macroeconomic consequences of 
alternative sequences (see, among others, McKinnon 1982; Frankel 1989; 
Edwards  1984, 1985; and Harberger  1985). The outcome of that debate 
was a generalized acceptance that the following sequencing was, in most 
cases, the preferred one: Major fiscal imbalances have to be tackled, and 
a minimal degree of macroeconomic stability should be attained very early 
in the reform process. Most analysts also agree that the liberalization of 
the capital account should only take place once trade liberalization reform 
has been implemented, and that financial reform (including the relaxation 
of capital controls) should only be implemented once a modern and effi- 
cient bank regulatory and supervisory framework is in place. Finally, there 
is  an increasing agreement that an effort should be made to ease labor 
market regulations as early as possible in the reform process. Three ideas 
are at the heart of this analysis. First, in a newly liberalized environment 
poorly regulated banks will tend to finance questionable projects, creating 
the potential for a financial meltdown. Moreover, with poor bank regula- 
tion-and  particularly in the presence of implicit deposit insurance-seri- 210  Sebastian Edwards 
ous moral hazard issues will  arise. Second, labor market flexibility will 
facilitate  the reallocation  of  resources  that  follow major  relative  price 
changes. And third, real exchange rate appreciations induced by  major 
capital inflows may frustrate a trade liberalization reform by reducing the 
export sector’s ability to compete internationally. 
The notion  that the capital account should be liberalized toward the 
end of the reform effort has acquired renewed prominence in the after- 
math of the 1997-98  East Asian crisis. For example, in an interview in the 
Financial  Times (9  February  1998), the  IMF’s managing  director  Mi- 
chel Camdessus said: “We need to be audacious but sensitive. We  need 
to push ahead with capital flow liberalisation but in an orderly manner” 
(1). He added: “The last thing you must liberalize is the very short term 
capital movements” (1  3). 
In the rest of this section I discuss the relationship between capital flows 
and real exchange rates within the context of the recent Latin American 
experiences. The potential role of capital controls and bank supervision 
in the liberalization process are taken up in the following sections. Figure 
7.4 presents the evolution of bilateral real exchange rate (RER) indexes 
for a selected group of  Latin American  countries for the period  1970 
through mid-1997.6  An increase in the values of these indexes represents 
a real depreciation and, thus, an increase in the country’s degree of interna- 
tional competitiveness. A number of  characteristics of real exchange rate 
behavior in Latin America emerge from these figures. First, RERs have 
historically been very volatile in Latin America. Comparative analyses on 
real exchange behavior have indeed shown that, for long periods of time, 
RER variability has been greater in Latin America than in  almost any 
other part of the world. Second, these figures show that in all eight coun- 
tries the RER depreciated drastically after the 1982 debt crisis, only to 
experience very large appreciations in the 1990s. These appreciations were 
largely caused, as I will argue later, by the surge of capital inflows in the 
1990s. Third, these figures show that for the majority of the countries in 
the sample the appreciation trend has slowed down in the last two or three 
quarters and, in some of them, it even seems to have ended. 
In figure 7.5 I provide a first look at the relationship between aggregate 
(net) capital inflows and the real exchange rate for a selected group of 
countries.’ As may be seen, in each of them there is a negative relationship 
between capital inflows and the real exchange rate: Increases in capital 
inflows have been associated with real exchange rate appreciation, while 
6.  These bilateral indexes are relative to the US. dollar and have a base of 1990 = 100. In 
their construction, the U.S. producer price index (PPI) and each individual country’s con- 
sumer price index (CP1) were used. 
7. These are the countries for which the IMF provides quarterly data on aggregate capital 
influws  !r  order to have a larger sample, in table 7.1 below 1 have used data on quarterly 
changes in international reserves as a proxy for capital inflows. Capital Flows, Real Exchange Rates, and Capital Controls  211 
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declines in inflows are associated with RER depreciation. Correlation co- 
efficients between a proxy for quarterly capital inflows and the RER in- 
dexes support the view that for all countries in the sample there has been 
a negative association between these two variables (Edwards 1999). Table 
7.1 contains summary results for Granger causality tests for these two 
variables. These show that in seven out of the eight cases it is not possible 
to reject the hypothesis that capital flows cause real exchange rate. In three 
of the seven countries it is not possible to reject two-way causality, and in 
none of  the seven cases analyzed was it found that real exchange rate 
caused capital inflows.  When these tests were performed for alternative  sub- 
samples, similar findings were obtained. These results, then, provide pre- 
liminary support for the view that the recent surge in capital flows have been 
(partially) responsible for generating the loss in real international com- 
petitiveness reported above. Argentina 
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The exact way  in which capital inflows will  be translated into a real 
exchange rate appreciation will depend on the nature of the nominal ex- 
change  rate  system and  on the way  the  monetary  authorities  react  to 
changes in the key macroeconomic variables. Under a fixed exchange rate 
regime, the increased availability of foreign resources will  result  in the 
accumulation  of  international  reserves  at  the  central  bank,  monetary 
expansion, and increased inflation. This, in turn, will pressure the RER to- 
ward appreciation. As I have discussed in greater detail in Edwards (1999), 
many countries have tried to tackle this problem by attempting to sterilize 
these flows. Under a flexible exchange rate regime, on the other hand, 
large capital inflows will generate a nominal-as  well as real-apprecia- 
tion. 
A  number  of analysts have  argued  that the appreciation of  the real 214  Sebastian Edwards 
Table 7.1  Capital Inflows and Real Exchange Rates in Selected Latin American 
Countries: Some Basic Statistical Relations (quarterly data, 1980-97) 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
Do Capital Inflows  Do Real Exchange 
“Cause” Real  Rates “Cause” 
Exchange Rates?  Capital Inflows? 
Argentina  -0.723 
Brazil  -0.727 
Chile  -0.382 
Colombia  -0.145 
Mexico  -0.656 
Peru  -0.478 















Note: Quarterly changes in international reserves were used as a proxy for capital inflows. 
Granger causality tests were performed. The results for Colombia and Venezuela are sensi- 
tive to the sample considered. If  1985-97  is used, the correlation coefficient is larger (in 
absolute terms), and in the case of Colombia it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that 
capital inflows “cause” real exchange rates. 
exchange rate following a surge in capital inflows is an equilibrium phe- 
nomenon, that is, one generated by fundamentals. This was, for example, 
the approach taken by the Mexican authorities during 1991-94  when a 
number of independent observers argued that the real appreciation of the 
peso was not sustainable and was bound to generate a major currency 
crisis.8  A limitation of this interpretation, however, is that it fails to incor- 
porate the stock flows dynamics of adjustment following a major capital 
inflows episode. Most developing countries have traditionally faced an ex- 
ternal cre‘dit constraint. This constraint, however, is usually relaxed when 
the country in question begins implementing what is perceived to be a 
successful market-oriented reform process. This relaxation in the external 
credit constraint will, in turn, have two implications. First, it will result in 
an increase in the long-run sustainable volume of capital inflows. In gen- 
eral, this long-run sustainable level will depend on the stock demand for 
the country’s securities by  foreigners, the country’s real rate of growth, 
and the world interest rate. Second, the relaxation of the capital constraint 
will generate a short-run overshooting  in the inflow of capital into the 
country. The reason for this is that in order for the new  (stock) demand 
for the country’s securities to become effective in the short run-while  the 
additional credit that has become available to the country is disbursed- 
capital inflows (and the current account deficit) will have to exceed their 
long-run equilibrium volume. In most instances, this adjustment process 
will not be instantaneous; in some cases it will even take a few years. His- 
8. For discussions on Mexico’s real exchange rate appreciation in 1991-94  see, e.g., Dorn- 
busch (1993), Dornbusch and Werner (1994), and Edwards (1993). On Mexico’s  official posi- 
tion regarding these developments see, e.g., Banco de Mexico (various years). Capital Flows, Real Exchange Rates, and Capital Controls  215 
torically, episodes of capital inflows surges have been characterized by in- 
creases in the demand for the small country securities on the order of 20 
to 30 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), and by peak annual in- 
flows on the order of 7 to 9 percent of GDP (World Bank 1997). 
One of the most important dynamic effects of the transition described 
above is on the real exchange rate. As capital flows in, there will be an in- 
crease in expenditure and an appreciation in the real exchange rate. The ex- 
tent of this appreciation will vary from country to country and will depend, 
largely, on two sets of key variables: the intertemporal elasticity of aggregate 
demand, on the one hand, and the income elasticity of demand and supply 
elasticity for nontradable goods, on the other. The intertemporal elasticity 
will determine the extent of consumption smoothing and the distribution 
of the expenditure increase through time; the elasticities for nontradables, 
on the other hand, will determine the extent to which the surge in capital 
inflows will exercise pressure on nontradable prices (see Edwards 1989 for 
a  formal  treatment  of  these  issues using  an optimizing  intertemporal 
model). Once capital stops flowing in, or even when the rate at which it 
flows slows down and moves down toward its (new) long-run equilibrium 
level, the real exchange rate will be “overly” appreciated and, in order to 
maintain equilibrium, a massive adjustment may be required. The dynam- 
ics of capital inflows and current account adjustment will  require, then, 
that the equilibrium real exchange rate first appreciates and then depre- 
ciates. And while during the surge in inflows the real exchange rate ap- 
preciates without any impediment, when the availability of foreign capital 
declines nominal wage and price rigidity will make the required real depre- 
ciation difficult.  under a pegged exchange rate.9 
In order to gain further insights into the dynamic interactions between 
capital flows and real exchange rates, I estimated a series of unrestricted 
vector autoregressives (VARs) for a subgroup of countries using quarterly 
data. This analysis poses a number of data-related challenges, however, 
and the results obtained should be interpreted with caution. First, given 
the tumultuous nature of recent Latin American history, the length of use- 
ful time series is rather limited. This problem is particularly serious in Ar- 
gentina and Brazil, where bouts of hyperinflation during the late 1980s and 
early 1990s introduced significant noise into the data. Second, until the 
late 1980s, most countries in the region faced severe external credit con- 
straints and were unable to attract foreign capital. This reduces the time 
span of  available data even further. Third, many  of these countries do 
not have detailed data on capital flows at the quarterly frequency. For this 
reason, I have focused on aggregate capital inflows, and in some of them 
I have followed Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart  (1993) and have used 
9. This type of analysis has been made in relation to the sequencing of reform debate. See, 
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quarterly changes in international reserves as a proxy for aggregate capital 
flows. Although it would  have been ideal to use disaggregated  quarterly 
data, some comfort can be drawn from the fact that, as argued by Calvo, 
Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993, 1995), in most countries changes in inter- 
national reserves are a fairly good proxy of capital flows. In the appendix 
I present a detailed description of the data and their sources. Fourth, in 
some of these countries there were important changes in the nature of capi- 
tal controls in the last few years. The way in which these controls potentially 
affected the relationship between capital inflows and real exchange rates 
is addressed in some detail in section 7.4 of this paper. 
The VAR  analysis reported  below  attempts  to address the following 
questions. (1) Do innovations to capital flows generate an appreciation in 
the real exchange rate, as predicted by standard real exchange rate models? 
(2) How pronounced and persistent  are these effects? (3)  Is it possible to 
identify differences across countries in the dynamic response of the real ex- 
change rate to capital flows shock? The following variables were included 
in these quarterly VARs: the log of a bilateral real  exchange rate index 
relative to the United States; a measure of capital flows (see the appendix 
for exact definitions for each  country); the rate  of  growth  of domestic 
credit; interest rate differentials adjusted by a proxy for expected devalua- 
tion (see the discussion in section 7.4 for the methodology used to measure 
expected devaluation);  and the rate of inflation.  In addition, in  Brazil, 
Chile, and Colombia a measure of the importance of capital controls was 
also included in some of the estimates. In the case of Colombia I also in- 
cluded a terms of trade index and an index of the extent of trade protec- 
tion.I0 In all cases the analysis was undertaken using the cyclical compo- 
nent of the series; this, in turn, was obtained by filtering the series using 
the Hodrick-Prescott procedure.  In all cases the cyclical components of 
the series exhibited stationarity." 
Figure 7.6 shows, for a selected group of Latin American countries, the 
impulse response functions of the cyclical component  of the log of the 
bilateral real exchange rate index to a one standard deviation innovation 
to capital flows. As may be seen in all cases, the capital flows shock gener- 
ated an appreciation in the real exchange rate, as predicted by the theory. 
Interestingly enough, both the magnitude and dynamics of the response 
varies across countries. More important for our analysis, however, is the 
surprisingly small effect these capital flows innovations have on the (log 
of the) real exchange rate. As may be seen, these effects range from a 4.0 
percent appreciation in Argentina to a 0.8 percent appreciation in Chile 
and Brazil, in response to a one standard deviation shock in capital in- 
10. In the case of Colombia, the domestic credit variable was excluded due to the lack of 
11. Due to the small number of observations it was not possible to consider very long lag 
a complete time series. 
structures. ln most VARs two to four lags were considered. Capital Flows, Real Exchange Rates, and Capital Controls  217 
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Response of log(RER) to one standard deviation innovation in 
flows. Interestingly enough, these results are largely independent of the 
variables' ordering in the VAR estimation (see the discussion below, how- 
ever). There are a number of possible explanations for these results. First, 
the data on capital flows are measured with error and it is possible that, 
as a result, the impact of an aggregate capital inflow is underestimated by 
the statistical analysis. Second, it is possible that while shocks to aggregate 
flows have a limited effect on the real exchange rate, some type of capital 
movements-portfolio  flows, for instance-will  have  a greater  impact. 
Unfortunately, the lack of appropriate quarterly data does not allow us to 
investigate this possibility. Third, it is possible that the magnitude of the 
effect has changed over time, and that by using a relatively longer time 
series these effects are being missed. More specifically, from a policy per- 
spective, it is particularly important whether these relationships have dif- 
fered in periods with and without capital controls. This possibility is ex- 
plored in greater detail in section 7.4 using data on Chile. 
An  analysis of  the variance decomposition  of these VARs,  not pre- 218  Sebastian Edwards 
sented here due to space considerations, indicates that in spite of the small 
effect on the real exchange rate discussed above, capital inflows have in- 
deed played an important role in explaining changes in real exchange rate 
indexes in these countries. As is customary, in estimating these VARs the 
different series were ordered in a way that takes into account their degree 
of exogeneity. As mentioned, when alternative ordering were tried, how- 
ever, most of the results reported here were not altered. 
During the 1990s most Latin American countries tried to minimize the 
macroeconomic-and  in particular the real exchange rate-consequences 
of capital inflow surges. Two basic approaches have been used to deal with 
this phenomenon:  (1) The imposition  of some form of capital controls 
aimed at slowing down the rate at which foreign funds come into the coun- 
try. Brazil, Chile, and Colombia have made a fairly extensive use of this 
policy (see the discussion in section 7.4 for details). (2) Sterilized interven- 
tion, aimed at offsetting the monetary-and  inflationary-consequences 
of the capital inflows. Almost every country in the region has attempted 
this approach. 
The extent to which countries in the region have relied on sterilization 
has varied, however, with Colombia and Chile being particularly active. 
This is illustrated in figure 7.7, which contains the impulse response func- 
tions of domestic credit creation to a one standard deviation innovation 
of capital inflows in Chile during different periods. As may be seen, in all 
cases the  original  response has  been to tighten domestic liquidity. Al- 
though it has been widely used, sterilized intervention is not free of prob- 
lems. In particular, if undertaken in a systematic fashion, as has been the 
case in many Latin American countries during the last few years, it can 
be very costly for the central bank. This is because interest earnings on 
international reserves are rather low, while the central bank has to pay a 
relatively high interest rate to persuade the public to buy its own securities. 
Calvo (1991), for example, has argued that this cost can become so high 
that it may threaten the sustainability of the complete reform effort. More- 
over, as Frankel (1989) has pointed out, in an economy with capital mobil- 
ity and predetermined nominal exchange rates it is not possible for the 
monetary  authorities to control monetary aggregates in the medium to 
long run. This view has been confirmed by  econometric estimates of the 
monetary “offset” coefficient for a number of countries (see, e.g., the stud- 
ies in Steiner 1995). 
Colombia’s experience with sterilization during the early  1990s illus- 
trates very clearly what Calvo (1991) has called “the perils of sterilization.” 
In 1990 the newly elected President Gaviria announced a trade liberali- 
zation program aimed at eliminating import licensing and greatly reduc- 
ing import tariffs. At the same time, a twenty-year-old exchange and capi- 
tal controls mechanism was eliminated. By  March 1991, however, it was 1981:l  1996:4 
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becoming  increasingly clear  that  the trade  reform  was  not having the 
effects the economic team had anticipated. Perhaps the most surprising 
fact was that imports were not growing and that, as a result, the country 
was experiencing an increasing trade surplus. This, in conjunction with 
larger inflows of capital, was exerting pressuring on money supply, making 
macroeconomic management very difficult. As inflation increased, the real 
exchange rate began to lose ground, and both exporters and important 
competing sectors began to lose competitiveness. The Banco de la Repub- 
lica reacted to this situation by  implementing a series of policies that in 
retrospect appear to have been contradictory among themselves. First, an 
aggressive policy of sterilizing reserve accumulation was undertaken. This 
was done by issuing indexed short-term securities (the obligaciunes mone- 
tavias [OMAS]).  In the first ten months of 1991 the stock of this instrument 
shot up from US405  million to US$1.2 billion, or 85 percent of the total 
monetary base. Naturally, this policy resulted in an increase in domestic 
(peso denominated) interest rates and a significant interest rate differen- 
tial. This attracted further capital into the country, frustrating the steriliza- 
tion policy itself. Second, the authorities decided-as  they had in the past 
when facing coffee booms-to  postpone the monetization of export pro- 
ceeds. For this reason, in 1991 the monetary authority stopped buying for- 
eign exchange in the spot market. Instead it started issuing “exchange cer- 
tificates” (certiJicadus de cambio) in exchange for export foreign currency 
proceeds. These certificates could be transacted in the secondary market 
and initially had a three-month maturity, which was later extended to one 
year. Moreover, the central bank established a maximum discount for the 
certificates in the secondary market of 12.5 percent. All of this, of course, 
amounted to an attempt at controlling too many variables-the  spot and 
future exchange rates, the nominal interest rate, and the stock of money- 
at inconsistent levels. During the first ten months of 1991 Colombia had 
been trapped in a vicious circle: A very rapid process of reserve accumula- 
tion generated high inflation and a real exchange rate appreciation; but 
the policies put in place to combat these phenomena created incentives 
for capital inflows and a further appreciation of the real exchange rate. 
7.4  Capital Controls: How Extensive? How Effective? 
7.4.1  Issues and Measurement 
Historically,  most  Latin  American  countries  have  relied  heavily  on 
different forms of  capital controls. While throughout  most of the post- 
World War I1 period these have been aimed at avoiding capital “flight,” 
more recently-and  for the reasons discussed above-countries  have tried 
to avoid (or at least slow down) large inflows of capital. There has long Capital Flows, Real Exchange Rates, and Capital Controls  221 
been a recognition, however, that legal impediments on capital mobility 
are not always translated into actual restrictions on these movements. This 
distinction between actual and legal capital mobility has been the subject 
of intense policy debate in  Latin America. Naturally, this discussion is 
directly related to the important question of  the effectiveness of capital 
controls.  There is ample historical evidence suggesting that there  have 
been significant discrepancies between the legal and the actual degree of 
capital controls.  In countries with  severe legal impediments to capital 
mobility-including  countries that have banned capital movement-the 
private sector has traditionally resorted to the overinvoicing of imports 
and underinvoicing of exports to sidestep legal controls on capital flows. 
The massive volumes of capital flight that took place in Latin America in 
the wake of the 1982 debt crisis clearly showed that, when faced with the 
“appropriate” incentives, the public can be extremely creative in finding 
ways to move capital internationally. The question of how to measure, 
from an economic point of view,  the degree of capital mobility and the 
extent to which domestic capital markets are integrated to the world capi- 
tal market continue to be the subject of extensive debate (see Dooley, Ma- 
thieson, and Rojas-Suarez 1997 for a comprehensive recent treatment of 
the subject). 
In two early studies Harberger (1978, 1985) argued that the effective 
degree of integration of capital markets should be measured by  the con- 
vergence of private rates of return to capital across countries. In trying 
to measure the effective degree of capital mobility, Feldstein and Horioka 
(1980) analyzed the behavior of  savings and investments in a number of 
countries. They argue that if  there is perfect capital mobility, changes in 
savings and investments will be uncorrelated in a specific country. That is, 
in a world without capital restrictions an increase in domestic savings will 
tend to “leave the home country,” moving to the rest of the world. Like- 
wise, if international capital markets are fully integrated, increases in do- 
mestic investment will  tend to be funded by  the world at large and not 
necessarily by domestic savings. Using a data set for sixteen member coun- 
tries  of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), Feldstein and Horioka found that savings and investment ratios 
were highly positively correlated, and they concluded  that these results 
strongly supported the presumption that long-term capital was subject to 
significant impediments.  Frankel (1  989) applied  the  Feldstein-Horioka 
test to a large number of countries during the 1980s, including a number 
of Latin American nations. His results corroborated those obtained by the 
original study, indicating that savings and investment have been signifi- 
cantly positively correlated in most countries. In a comprehensive analysis 
of the degree of capital, Montiel  (1994) estimated a series of  Feldstein- 
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Latin American  nations.I2 Using the estimated regression coefficient for 
the industrial countries as a benchmark, Montiel concluded that the ma- 
jority of the Latin American nations exhibited a relatively high degree of 
capital mobility-indeed  much larger than what an analysis of legal restric- 
tions would suggest. 
In a series of studies, Edwards (1985, 1988) and Edwards and Khan 
(1985) argued that time series on domestic and international interest rates 
could be used to assess the degree of openness of the capital account (see 
also Montiel 1994). The application of this model to a number of countries 
(Brazil, Colombia, Chile) confirms the results that, in general, the actual 
degree of capital mobility is greater than what the legal restrictions ap- 
proach suggests. Haque and Montiel (1991), Reisen and Yeches (1991), 
and Dooley (1995) have provided expansions of this model that allow for 
the estimation of the degree of capital mobility even in cases when there 
are not enough data on domestic interest rates and when there are changes 
in the degree of capital mobility through time. Their results once again 
indicate that in most Latin American countries “true” capital mobility 
has historically exceeded “legal” extent of capital mobility. More recently, 
Dooley, Mathieson,  and Rojas-Suarez (1997) have developed a method 
for measuring the changes in the degree of capital mobility in developing 
countries. They argue that in countries with capital controls and interest 
rates  ceilings, traditional  approaches  such  as  the  Edwards  and Khan 
(1985) approach can generate misleading results. They develop a model 
that  recognizes the costs of undertaking  disguised capital inflows. The 
model is estimated using a Kalman filter technique for three countries, 
including Mexico. The results suggest that Mexico-as  well as the Philip- 
pines and Korea-experienced  a very significant increase in the degree of 
capital mobility between 1977 and 1989. 
7.4.2  Some Evidence: Chile’s Experiences with 
Capital Restrictions during the 1990s 
Chile and Colombia have been the heaviest users of restrictions on capi- 
tal mobility in Latin America during the last few years. In both countries 
these controls have been part of a concerted effort to avoid some of the 
destabilizing short-term effects-and  in particular the real exchange rate 
appreciation-of  capital inflow surges. In their current form capital con- 
trols were introduced in 1991 in Chile and in 1993 in C01ombia.l~  In both 
countries the restrictions have been based on an unremunerated reserve 
requirement that importers of capital have to deposit in the central bank. 
12. The Montiel study was based on time series estimates. The Feldstein-Horioka  ap- 
proach, on the other hand, was devised as a cross-sectional procedure. 
13. It should be noted that both of these countries had a long tradition with capital con- 
trols before the 1990s. See, e.g., Edwards (1999). Brazil has also relied on capital controls 
during the 1990s. See Cardoso and Goldfajn (1997). Capital Flows, Real Exchange Rates, and Capital Controls  223 
The specific aspects of both of these schemes are presented in detail in 
this section (see also Budnevich and LeFort 1997; Cardenas and Barrera 
1997; and Edwards 1999). 
The Chilean experience with capital restrictions has received consider- 
able attention by policy makers and media analysts in the aftermath of the 
East Asian currency crises of 1997-98.  Some observers have argued that 
Chile’s approach to capital movements has been effective in reducing vul- 
nerability to speculative periods and reducing the real exchange rate “de- 
protection” effect of large capital inflows. For example, Joseph Stiglitz, the 
World Bank’s chief economist, has been quoted by the New York Times (1 
February 1998) as saying: “You want to look for policies that discourage 
hot money but facilitate the flow of long-term loans, and there is evidence 
that the Chilean approach or some version of it, does this.” Not everyone, 
however, is as enthusiastic with this scheme. According to the Financial 
Times (January 19SS), for instance, “Chile’s controls are on inflows rather 
than outflows of capital, but the new figures suggest that the controls have 
not been successful in preventing the entry of speculative capital” (7, italics 
added). Even if the Chilean type of restrictions have been successful in re- 
ducing the extent of real appreciation, the issue of “permanence” still has 
to be addressed. For how long are these restrictions to be maintained? Are 
they a transitional device, or are they a permanent feature of the Chilean 
economy? When is an economy mature enough to open its cross-border 
capital transactions fully? Some of these issues are addressed toward the 
end of this section, while other are tackled in the rest of the paper. 
In this subsection I provide an empirical evaluation of Chile’s experi- 
ence with capital controls during the 1990~’~  It should be stated at the 
outset that evaluating the effectiveness of capital restrictions is an exceed- 
ingly difficult task. First, as already pointed out, the length of the available 
time series is rather limited. Second, data for some important variables are 
not readily available and, thus, proxies have to be constructed. Third, it is 
not always clear what criteria should be used to evaluate whether a partic- 
ular set of restrictions has been effe~tive.’~  In fact, it is possible that while 
according to specific criteria the policy has been appropriate, according 
to an alternative perspective it has been ineffective. It is particularly im- 
portant to avoid methodological traps-into  which some media analysts 
and even senior observers of the international scene seem to fall so eas- 
ily-of  the type: “Chile has grown very fast avoiding a currency crisis, 
14. Mexico still maintains some (minimal) restrictions on FDI. Argentina also has free 
capital mobility. Its experience is more recent, however, and the highly unstable macroeco- 
nomic environment of the 1980s and early  1990s reduces greatly the length of time series 
data. 
15. Notice that I have used the word efective  and not successful. This is deliberate, as I 
have made no attempt to provide a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of Chile’s capital re- 
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Table 7.2  Restrictions on Capital Inflows into Chile 
Type of Capital Inflow  Restriction 
Foreign direct investment  Minimum stay of one year. No restrictions on 
repatriation of profits. 
The issuance of ADRs by Chilean companies is 
strictly regulated. Only companies that meet a 
certain risk classification requirement (BBB for 
nonfinancial companies, and BBB+ for financial 
institutions) can issue ADRs. There is also a 
minimum amount requirement: Until September 
1994, this was US$50 million; at that time it was 
lowered to US$25 million; and in November 
1995 it was further reduced to US$lO million. 
All other portfolio inflows-including  secondary 
Portfolio inflows: Issuing 
of ADRs 
Other portfolio inflows 
Trade credit 
ADR inflows, foreign loans, bond issues-are 
subject to a nonremunerated 30 percent reserve 
requirement. This reserve requirement is 
independent of the length of stay of the inflow. 
In the case of loans and bonds, the recipient 
may choose to pay the financial cost of the 
reserve requirement. 
Credit lines used to finance trade operations are 
also subject to the 30 percent deposit. 
Source: Budnevich and LeFort (1997). 
and has capital restrictions. Ergo, capital restrictions of the Chilean type 
are desirqble!” 
In Chile restrictions to capital movements have taken two basic forms: 
minimum stay requirements for FDI flows and nonremunerated reserve 
requirements on other forms of capital inflows. Table 7.2 contains details 
on these regulations, as of the third quarter of  1997. It is interesting to 
compare Chile’s experience with that of Colombia, where capital controls 
have taken the form of a variable reserve requirement on foreign loans- 
except trade credit-obtained  by the private sector. Initially this reserve 
requirement  was set in  Colombia at a rate of 47 percent and was only 
applicable to loans with a maturity shorter than eighteen months. During 
1994, and as the economy was flooded with capital inflows, the reserve 
requirements were tightened. In March they were made extensive to all 
loans with a maturity below three years; in August they were extended to 
loans of five years or less. Moreover, the rate of the reserves requirement 
became inversely proportional to the maturity of the loan: thirty-day loans 
were subject to a stiff 140 percent reserve requirement, making them virtu- 
ally prohibitive, while five-year loans had to meet a 42.8 percent deposit. 
In both Chile and Colombia restrictions to capital movements act as an 
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In evaluating Chile’s recent experience with capital restrictions I have 
focused on three issues. First, is there evidence that capital controls have 
affected the composition of capital flows? Second, is there evidence that 
the imposition of restrictions to capital mobility has affected the dynamic 
response of the real exchange rate to capital flows shocks? The importance 
of this question stems from the fact that the restrictions were deliberately 
imposed to reduce the real exchange rate deprotection associated with the 
surge in capital inflows (Valdes-Prieto and Soto 1996a). I tackle this ques- 
tion by  estimating a series of unrestricted  VARs on quarterly data and 
analyzing  the real  exchange rate  impulse response  functions. Third,  is 
there evidence that the impositions of the unremunerated reserve require- 
ments affected in a significant way  the relationship between Chile’s and 
international interest rates? More specifically, I inquire whether these re- 
strictions affected the time series process of interest rate differentials (cor- 
rected by expected devaluation) in Chile. In general one would expect that 
impediments to free capital mobility would affect both the speed at which 
interest rate differentials decline as well as the level to which they converge. 
I address this third question through  the analysis  of  impulse response 
functions and the estimation of a series of univariate equations using roll- 
ing regression techniques. 
In a recent study Valdes-Prieto and Soto (1996b) have calculated the 
tax equivalence of Chile’s unremunerated reserve requirement on capital 
inflows and have evaluated their effect on a number of variables including 
real exchange rates. The authors conclude that these restrictions have not 
been (fully) evaded and that for a 180-day loan their annual tax equiva- 
lence has fluctuated between 1.29 and 4.53 percent. The implicit tax equiv- 
alence of longer-term funds has been, since mid- 1992, proportional, with 
loans with longer maturities paying a lower implicit tax (see also Cowan 
and De Gregorio  1997). According  to Valdes-Prieto and Soto (1996a, 
1996b) these capital restrictions altered the composition of capital inflows: 
They discouraged short-term capital inflows but had no significant effects 
on the aggregate volume of capital entering the country. 
In table 7.3 I present data on the composition of capital flows into Chile 
between 1988 and 1996. As may be seen, there has indeed been a marked 
change in the composition of capital inflows, with shorter (that is less than 
a year) flows declining steeply relative to longer-term capital. The fact that 
this change in composition happened immediately after the time when the 
capital restrictions were imposed supports the view that the controls policy 
has indeed affected the composition of inflows. These data also show that, 
with the exception of a brief decline in 1993, the total volume of capital 
inflows into the country has continued to increase. 
In the rest of this section I analyze the effect of (net) flows and capital 
controls on real exchange rates and on interest rate differentials. 226  Sebastian Edwards 
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“Deposits in Banco Chile due to reserve requirements. 
Capital Restrictions and Real Exchange Rates in Chile 
One of the fundamental purposes-if  not the main purpose-of  Chile’s 
restrictions on capital inflows has been to reduce their volume and, in that 
way, their pressure on the real exchange rate. According to a recent paper 
coauthored by a former senior Ministry of Finance official, “growing con- 
cerns about inflation and the exchange rate pressure of capital inflows have 
led  policymakers to introduce specific capital controls” (Cowan and De 
Gregorio 1997,3). Valdes-Prieto and Soto (1996b), on the other hand, have 
argued that the imposition of  these restrictions in mid-1991 responded 
to the authorities’ attempt to balance two policy objectives: reducing infla- 
tion and maintaining a competitive real exchange rate. According to these 
authors, by  implementing these unremunerated reserve requirements the 
authorities hoped to reduce-or  at least delay-the  real exchange rate ap- 
preciation effects of these flows, while at the same time maintain a higher 
differential between domestic and international  interest rates (corrected 
by expected devaluations). This higher differential, in turn, was expected 
to help achieve the anti-inflationary objective. In this subsection I evaluate 
the real exchange rate objective, while in the next I address the interest 
rate differential objective. 
I used two approaches to evaluate the real exchange rate objective of 
Chile’s capital controls policy. First, using quarterly data I reestimated the 
VARs from section 7.3 for two different subsamples-one  with and one 
without capital controls-and  evaluated the real exchange rate impulse 
response to capital  inflows innovations. Under  an effective policy one 
would expect that the real exchange rate response to a capital flow inno- 
vation would be less pronounced-both  in terms of its maximum effect 
as well  as its dynamics-in  the period with controls. Second, I used the 
longer period VARs (1 987-96)  estimates to evaluate the impulse response Capital Flows, Real Exchange Rates, and Capital Controls  227 
to a shock to the tax equivalence of the unremunerated reserve require- 
ment.I6 
Figure 7.8 contains the impulse response functions for the log of  the 
real exchange rate for the complete period (1981-96),  a subperiod with no 
restrictions on capital inflows (1987-91:Q2),  and a subperiod when the 
capital restrictions have been put into effect (1991:Q3-96). The same data 
definitions as in the preceding section were used. Figure 7.9, on the other 
hand, contains the real exchange rate response to an innovation to the 
(implicit) tax on capital inflows.17 Two important facts emerge from these 
figures. First, the effect of the capital innovation on the (log) of the real ex- 
change rate are extremely similar across periods. As may be seen, the max- 
imum appreciation is almost the same in the with-restrictions period and 
in the period where there were restrictions to capital inflows. However, the 
(log) of  the real exchange rate returns to equilibrium somewhat faster in 
the with-restrictions period. This result is  confirmed by  the impulse re- 
sponse function in figure 7.9.18 As may be  seen, an innovation to restric- 
tions on inflows results in a slight real depreciation. The effect is  short 
lived, however, and disappears after four quarters. The ordering of  the 
variables is, as usual, important. In determining the ordering, one could 
be  tempted to argue that capital controls are exogenous. This, however, 
could be highly misleading since in Chile, as in other emerging markets, 
the extent and coverage of controls have been  adjusted  in  response to 
changes in the magnitude of capital flows. For this reason, alternative or- 
derings-including  one where capital controls are allowed to respond en- 
dogenously-were  considered. Overall, the results under alternative order- 
ings confirm the results from figure 7.9. The variance decomposition of 
the forecast errors of the (log of the) real exchange rate, not presented here 
due to space considerations (results available on request), confirms that 
the restrictions on capital inflows have not been effective in affecting the 
real exchange rate behavior: The capital restrictions variable explains no 
more than 3 percent of the forecast error. 
Although these results are subject to some limitations-the  experience 
with capital restrictions is  rather short, limiting the availability of  data 
points, and a proxy for aggregate capital flows was used-they  do provide 
preliminary evidence suggesting that the impact of this policy on the real 
exchange rate has been very limited and short lived. These results confirm 
16. The tax equivalences estimated by Valdes-Prieto and Soto (1996b) were updated to the 
end of  1997. 
17. Cardoso and Goldfajn (1997) analyze a series of impulse response functions to a capi- 
tal controls innovation in Brazil. 
18. As Cardoso and Goldfajn (1997) have argued, capital controls in Latin America are 
likely to be endogenous. Thus, care should be taken in establishing the vector ordering in 
the VAR estimation. 1981  :I 1996:4 
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previous findings by  Valdes-Prieto and Soto (1996b), who, using a very 
different technique and a shorter sample to estimate a real exchange rate 
equation for Chile, concluded that “the unremunerated reserve require- 
ment does not affect in any way  the long run level of the real exchange 
rate. . . . In addition . . . these reserve requirements have an insignificant 
effect on the real exchange rate in the short run” (99). 
Capital Restrictions and Interest Rate Differentials in Chile 
Since the mid-1980s Chile’s monetary authorities have used interest rate 
targeting as one of the main-if  not the main-anti-inflationary  tools 
(Fontaine 1996). More specifically, as a way to reduce inflation, the central 
bank  has  systematically attempted  to maintain  relatively  high  interest 
rates. This policy, however, became increasingly difficult to sustain during 
the late 1980s and 1990s when, as a result of Chile’s improving stance in 
international financial markets,  higher domestic rates  started to attract 
increasingly large volumes of capital. A fundamental objective of the capi- 
tal restrictions policy in effect since 1991, then, has been to allow the coun- 
try to maintain a higher interest rate. According to Cowan and De Gre- 
gorio (1997, 16), “capital controls allowed policy makers to rely on the 
domestic interest rate as the main instrument for reducing inflation. . . . 
The reserve requirement has permitted maintaining the domestic interest 
rate above the international interest rate, without imposing excessive pres- 
sure on the exchange rate.” In this subsection I use a battery of time series 
estimates to formally investigate the way in which capital restrictions have, 
in fact, affected interest rate differentials, and thus the ability to perform 
independent monetary policy, in Chile. 230  Sebastian Edwards 
In the absence of restrictions to capital mobility, and under the assump- 
tion of risk neutrality and in the absence of country risk, the uncovered 
interest  arbitrage condition will hold, and deviations from it would be 
white noise and unpredictable. The speed at which these deviations from 
interest arbitrage are eliminated is  an empirical question, but in a well- 
functioning market it would be expected to happen very fast. The exis- 
tence of restrictions to capital mobility and of country risk, however, alter 
this basic equation in  a fundamental way.  In this case there will be an 
equilibrium interest rate differential (6): 
6, = r, - r: - EAe, = k  + R  + u,, 
where Y, is the domestic interest rate, r:  is the international interest rate 
for a security of the same maturity, EAe is the expected rate of devaluation, 
k is the tax equivalence of the capital restriction, R is  the country risk 
premium, and u, is an identical independently distributed (i.i.d.) random 
variable. As in the case of free capital mobility, if at any moment in time 
the actual interest rate differential exceeds (k + R),  there will be incentives 
to arbitrageurs to move funds in or out of the country. This process will 
continue until the equilibrium interest rate differential is reestablished. The 
speed at which this process takes place will, in principle, depend on the 
degree of development of the domestic capital market, as well as on the 
degree of capital mobility existing in the country in question. Countries 
with stiffer restrictions will experience slow corrections of deviations from 
the equilibrium interest rate differential (Edwards and Khan 1985; Dooley 
1995; Dooley, Mathieson, and Rojas-Suarez 1997). Additionally, as equa- 
tion (1) SLOWS,  the degree of capital restrictions (that is, k)  will also affect 
the value toward which the interest rate differential will converge.19 
In a world with changing policies, k is not constant through time. In 
fact, as has been documented in the preceding sections, the value of k has 
changed markedly in most Latin American countries during the last few 
years. With other things given, it would be expected that the imposition 
(or tightening) of capital restrictions will have two effects on the behavior 
of the interest rate differential. First it will increase the value toward which 
this differential converges; second, it will  reduce the speed at which this 
convergence takes place. This means that under stricter restrictions on cap- 
ital mobility, the monetary authority gains greater control over domestic in- 
terest rates in two ways. First, it can maintain a higher interest rate dif- 
ferential-that  is, the steady-state value of 6 will be higher than what it 
would have been otherwise. Second, 6 can deviate from its long-run equil- 
ibrium for longer periods of time. In this subsection I use quarterly and 
19. The tax equivalence of  a Chile-style reserve requirement will  be a function of  the 
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monthly data on interest rate differentials for Chile to investigate the way 
in which the imposition and tightening of capital restrictions affected their 
behavior. 
A problem with equation (1) is that there are no long reliable series on 
expectations of  devaluation.20 In order to address this problem  I con- 
structed a series of expected devaluations as the one-step-ahead forecasts 
obtained from an autoregressive moving average (ARMA) process for the 
actual rate of devaluation. After identifying the possible processes, several 
plausible representations were estimated. Finally, those that provided the 
better forecasts-measured  according to standard criteria-were  used. In 
the case of quarterly data I used an ARMA(2,1), while for monthly data 
I used an autoregressive (AR[l]) process to construct the expected devalu- 
ation series.21 
As a first step, unrestricted VARs estimated on quarterly data were used 
to estimate impulse response functions of interest rate differentials to a 
one standard deviation  innovation  of  themselves: Figure  7.10 presents 
these impulses for two subsamples: 1981-91,  when there were no capital re- 
strictions; and 1991-96,  when the restrictions were in place. As may be seen, 
in both periods the deviation of 6 from its equilibrium tended to disap- 
pear quite rapidly. This adjustment process seemed to have been some- 
what faster in the period with no capital restrictions. As may be seen from 
the figure, during this early period 6 has essentially gone back to trend 
after two quarters; for the later period, the adjustment is cyclical and after 
four quarters there is still a slight differential. This result is, in some ways, 
what one would have expected: In a period of capital restrictions interest 
rate differentials,  are somewhat more sluggish than in periods with no con- 
trols. A potential problem with this interpretation, however, is that during 
part of the earlier period (1986-87)  Chile was still facing a severe foreign 
credit constraint and had very limited access to international capital mar- 
kets. Unfortunately, due to the brevity of the experiments we  are analyz- 
ing, the issue of “restrictions” versus “access” cannot be addressed in an 
adequate way  using quarterly data. Monthly data, however, allow us to 
use additional information and explore the behavior of interest rate dif- 
ferentials further.22 
Assume that interest rate differential can be represented by  the follow- 
ing univariate process: 
20. In the last few years, however, there has been a forward market for foreign exchange, 
but the data available do not cover a long enough period for our purposes. 
21. The interest rate differentials series used in the VARs reported above were also con- 
structed using this procedure. 
22. A shortcoming of using monthly series, however, is that there are no data on many of 
the other variables of interest. For this reason, in the analysis that follows I have restricted 
myself to univariate methods. 1981  :I  1996:4 
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(2)  B(L)6, =  a+  G(L)u,, 
where L is the lag operator, B(L)  and G(L)  are polynomial functions of L, 
and a is a coefficient. The form of these polynomials will determine the 
dynamics of 6,, including whether it will converge to a steady-state value. 
This steady state, in turn will be determined by the form of the two polyno- 
mials and by a.  The simplest case is obtained when 
B(L) =  1 - PL;  A(L) =  1 
In this case interest rate differentials are characterized by  an AR(  1) pro- 
cess, and to the extent that p lies inside the unit circle, 6 will converge to 
[a/(l -  p)]. In the absence of controls and with a zero country risk pre- 
mium, we  would expect [aU/(l - p)] = 0, with interest rate differentials 
converging to zero. Moreover, in this case, we would expect that p would 
be very low, with interest rate differentials disappearing very rapidly. With 
country risk and capital restrictions, however, a would be different from 
zero, p will be rather high, and interest rate differentials will converge to 
a positive value. 
If there are policy changes-and,  in particular, if there are changes in 
the extent of capital restrictions-we  would expect that the parameters in 
equation (2) will change. The extent and importance of these changes can 
be analyzed empirically by  identifying and estimating univariate models 
of interest rate differentials for different periods of time. Table 7.4 presents 
the results obtained for Chile from the estimation of a number of alter- 
native ARMA processes for 6 for four different time periods. Since in all 
cases the AR(  1) representation proved to be adequate, in the discussion 
that follows I will  concentrate on these results.23  It is particularly  inter- 
esting to compare the no-restrictions period (1988:l-1991:6)  with the re- 
strictions period (1991:7-1996: 12). As may be seen, the AR coefficient is 
slightly lower in the second (no capital restrictions) subsample (0.40), than 
in the first one (0.46). This is contrary to what was expected; however, the 
difference is not statistically significant, as a test statistic strongly rejects 
the hypothesis of different AR coefficients across samples. According to 
these results the point estimate of the a coefficient is higher in the first sub- 
sample, although once again the difference is not statistically significant. 
The results obtained from this specific splitting of the sample, then, may 
be interpreted as suggesting that there are very few, if any, differences in 
the dynamics of interest rate differentials in these two periods. These re- 
sults, however, should be interpreted with care, since they are subject to 
at least two limitations. First, during the period under analysis the country 
23. It should be noted, however, that the interpretation of the results is not very different 
if any of the alternative representations is considered. Table 7.4  Measure of Persistence: Chile, Different Samples 
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risk  premium  associated  with  Chile  experimented  some  important 
changes. This means that a  in equation (2) will tend to change over time. 
Additionally, (Y  will also tend to change since the implicit tax on the re- 
striction capital mobility (k)  is a function of r*. Second, it is possible that 
the dynamics of interest rate differentials did not change exactly at the 
time of the imposition of the restrictions. After all, the implicit tax was 
rather small at first and there was substantial evasion. 
These issues were addressed in two ways. First, I added Chile’s ranking 
in Euromoney’s Country Risk Ratings as a proxy for the country risk pre- 
miums (see fig. 7.11 for the evolution of such ratings, where a higher num- 
ber means increased country risk), as well as the U.S. interest rate to the re- 
gression. Second, I considered two alternative dates for splitting the sample: 
July 1992 and January 1993. Both of these dates correspond to a tighten- 
ing of the inflows restrictions. The inclusion of the country risk  proxy 
and of the international interest rates had no significant effects on the 
estimation; in fact, the sign of the country risk proxy was the opposite of 
what was expected and nonsignificant, while that of the international in- 
terest rate was nonsignificant. Changing the dates did, on the other hand, 
have an effect on the estimation. This may be seen in table 7.5, where 
the results from an augmented equation for the dynamics of interest rate 
differentials are presented. In this equation, dummy variables that take 
the value of one for the postrestrictions period have been included. Two 
interesting features emerge from this table. First, the coefficient of lagged 
differentials is higher for both postrestrictions periods. Moreover, as may 
be seen, the results indicate that the (6 dummy) variable is marginally sig- 
ZOJ,,  ,  ,  ,  , 
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Fig. 7.11  Country risk premium for Chile 236  Sebastian Edwards 
Table 7.5  Dynamics of Interest Rate Differential: 198%96 (monthly data) 








































aThe dummy took a value of 1 from January 1993 onward. 
bThe  dummy took a value of 1 from June 1992 onward. 
nificant. This suggests that during at least some of the postrestrictions 
period, interest rate differentials were more sluggish than in the prerestric- 
tions period. This supports the notion that the restrictions  allowed the 
monetary  authorities  greater short-term control  over domestic interest 
rates. The fact, however, that the estimated valued of the constant experi- 
enced a slight decline in the postrestrictions period suggests that the au- 
thorities’may  not have had  as much  control  over interest  rates  in  the 
longer run. 
In order to investigate the dynamic behavior of interest rates further, I 
estimated the following equation using a rolling regressions technique: 
(3) 
Two alternative windows of twenty-four and thirty-six months were con- 
sidered. The estimated coefficients were then used to estimate a rolling 
value of the steady-state interest rate differential. These results are pre- 
sented in figures 7.12, 7.13, and 7.14. In constructing these figures I dated 
each coefficient by  the last observation included in the sample. For ex- 
ample, in the case of the twenty-four-month window, the observation for 
19956 corresponds to the respective coefficient estimated using a sample 
spanning from  1993:6 through 1995:6. To the right of the vertical lines, 
then, the complete sample used to estimate the coefficients corresponds to 
the postrestrictions period. These results suggest that in the postrestric- 
tions period the degree of persistence of interest rate differentials (the esti- 
mated  value of  p) has increased slightly. This happened  after a period Capital Flows, Real Exchange Rates, and Capital Controls  237 
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Fig. 7.12  Chile: Alpha in AR(1) process 
(1990-93)  of gradual decline in persistence, which largely corresponded 
to the decline in Chile’s risk premium (see fig. 7.1 1). Although the increase 
in p has been rather small, the trend is quite clear and supports the view 
that, as the authorities had intended, the imposition of restrictions  on 
capital movements increased their short-term control over domestic inter- 
est rates. The results in figure 7.14 on the rolling estimates of the steady- 
state interest rate differentials are less clear cut. Regarding the postrestric- 
tions period, however, these estimates (and in particular the twenty-four- 
month window estimates) suggest that the steady-state differential trended 
gently upward  until  mid-1995; from that  time onward a decline is  ob- 
served. The most likely explanation for this reduction in the equilibrium 
differential is the recent improvement in Chile’s country risk position. Al- 
though these results cannot be considered as conclusive or definitive, they 
do provide a note of skepticism on Chile’s ability to control interest rate 
differentials over the longer run. 238  Sebastian Edwards 
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Capital Restrictions and Financial Vulnerability: 
Chile in Historical Perspective 
In the aftermath of the East Asian crisis a number of  observers have 
argued that capital controls-and  in particular restrictions on short-term 
capital inflows-will  help reduce the degree of vulnerability of the domes- 
tic financial sector. Once again, it has been argued that the Chilean experi- 
ence provides support for this policy view. The problem, however, is that 
from a methodological point of view it is not possible to know whether 
the absence of financial crises in Chile during the last few years has been 
the result of the capital controls policy or of other characteristics of the 
Chilean economy. 
As it turns out, Chile has relied on capital controls on two occasions 
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Fig. 7.14  Chile: Steady state in AR(1) process 
During both episodes capital restrictions took the form of unremunerated 
reserve requirements on short-term capital entering the country, and on 
both occasions the main goals of the policy were to protect the economy 
from currency speculation and to avoid the appreciation of the real ex- 
change rate. In spite of the existence of restrictions on capital mobility, in 
1981-82  Chile went through a traumatic crisis, when the peso was deval- 
ued by almost 90 percent and a large number of banks had to be bailed 
out by  the government. The main difference between then and now was 
not capital controls-virtually  identical controls were in place during both 240  Sebastian Edwards 
episodes-but  had  to do with banking sector regulations. In the early 
years Chilean banks were mostly unregulated and were allowed to specu- 
late in real estate and make questionable loans to their  owners. It is  a 
picture that strongly resembles crony capitalism in East Asia! A massive 
banking reform implemented in 1986 put an end to all of that. It established 
strict guidelines on banks’ exposure and activities and instituted a broad 
system of onsite inspections. This reform helped create a healthy, strong, 
and efficient banking system. The main purpose of this subsection is to 
provide a brief analysis of this earlier Chilean experience with restrictions 
on capital inflows. 
In  1976, as in  1991, the Chilean authorities became concerned about 
the increasing flow of capital into the country. For a variety of reasons- 
including the effect on the real exchange rate and on the financial sector- 
the authorities  decided  to restrict  capital inflows through  an array  of 
mechanisms. All capital moving into the country had to be registered with 
the central bank, Foreign lenders who wanted to have access to foreign ex- 
change in the future faced additional restrictions in the form of minimum 
maturities  and  maximum  interest  rates.  Loans  with  maturities  below 
twenty-four  months  were  forbidden,  and those  with  maturities  from 
twenty-four to sixty-six months were subject to unremunerated  reserves 
requirements ranging from 10 percent to 25 percent of the value of the 
loan. These reserve requirements were deposited in the central bank for 
the complete stay of the loan. Given the steepness of these deposits, until 
1982 the overwhelming majority of loans had maturities in excess of sixty- 
six months: the average maturity was fifty-four months in 1979, sixty-four 
months ,in  1980, and sixty months in  1981. For  all practical purposes, 
then, starting in  1976 Chile had in place a capital controls system that 
closely resembled the one implemented in 1991, and discussed in detail in 
the preceding section. In fact, it may be argued that, since flows of less 
than one year were prohibited, capital controls during the early years were 
stricter than during the more recent period. 
During the earlier episode Chilean banks faced important restrictions 
on the intermediation of foreign funds. These restrictions operated in two 
ways. First, there was a limit on the level of banks’ foreign liabilities. Sec- 
ond, and more importantly, there was a maximum amount by which banks 
could increase their foreign liabilities each month. Until December  1978 
foreign currency (gross) liabilities could not exceed 1.6 times the bank’s 
equity. At that time this limit was increased to 1.8 times the bank’s equity. 
In June 1979 a major step toward liberalizing the banking system was 
taken when the restriction on banks’ maximum ratio of foreign liabilities 
to equity was eliminated, and the level of foreign liabilities became subject 
to banks’ overall maximum debt to equity ratio of twenty. As a result of 
this, foreign funds intermediated by  domestic banks increased by  almost 
100 percent during that year. However, banks were still subject to a severe Capital Flows, Real Exchange Rates, and Capital Controls  241 
restriction on the maximum increase in the level of foreign liabilities per- 
mitted per month. In late 1979 the maximum monthly increase in bank’s 
(gross) foreign liabilities was “the largest of 5% of equity or US $2 mil- 
lion.” At this time this restriction on the maximum monthly increase in for- 
eign liabilities became binding, as banks could obtain from abroad large 
sums that could be brought only slowly into the country, In April  1980 
this flow restriction was eliminated and banks could increase their foreign 
liabilities as fast as they wanted. 
The vast majority of loans were obtained by private banks without gov- 
ernment guarantee. In fact, it was thought at the time by  the economic 
authorities and other observers that since most of the debt had been con- 
tracted by the private sector without any government guarantee, the very 
rapid increase in foreign debt did not represent a threat for the country as 
a whole: If  a domestic private borrower could not pay its foreign obli- 
gations, that was a private problem, between it and the foreign creditor, 
which would be solved through a regular bankruptcy procedure. 
In his 1981 Report of the Nation’s Economic Conditions, Minister de 
Castro even argued that private indebtedness from abroad should be ac- 
tively encouraged since it represented higher foreign savings. According 
to de Castro, “There is no doubt that the current account deficits . . . are 
highly beneficial for the country, and that we  should make an effort to 
maintain them at the highest possible level and for the larger possible pe- 
riod of time.” 
A major problem, however, was that at the time banks were very poorly 
regulated. This situation had already become apparent in  1976, when a 
medium-size bank-Banco  Osorno-failed.  The government decided to 
bail depositors out, ex  post  guaranteeing deposit and, thus, creating a 
classical moral hazard situation. But perhaps the most significant problem 
was that banks were owned by  major conglomerates that used them to 
shore up their firms, finance dubious investment projects, and fuel a major 
real estate boom. It has been estimated, for example, that in some banks 
more than 40 percent of the loan portfolio was concentrated on conglom- 
erate-owned firms (Edwards and Edwards 1991). In spite of the 1976 crisis, 
very little was done to put an end to this situation and the banks’ practice 
of channeling foreign funds to the conglomerates continued. In mid- 198 1, 
as international interest rates increased rapidly, asset prices in Chile began 
to fall and the demand for deposits experienced a significant decline. Some 
firms had difficulties in paying their debts, and in November  1981 two 
major banks-Banco  Espaiiol and Banco de Talca-ran  into serious dif- 
ficulties and had to be bailed out by the government. During late 1981 and 
early 1982, aggregate production collapsed, domestic interest rates con- 
tinued to increase, and the number of bankruptcies increased greatly. In 
the first half of 1982 deposits in the Chilean banking system-and  espe- 
cially deposits by foreigners-continued  to decline steeply. During the first 242  Sebastian Edwards 
five months of 1982 alone, foreign deposits in commercial banks dropped 
by 75 percent. In June 1982 the government decided to devalue the peso, 
in the hope of alleviating the speculative pressure on the economy. The 
devaluation, however, affected negatively the financial conditions of many 
firms that had borrowed heavily in dollars. Depositors decided to fly from 
peso-denominated assets, commercial banks continued to accumulate bad 
loans, and the central bank had to inject large amounts of funds into the 
economy. In January 1983 the government concluded that the costs of this 
muddling through strategy were too high and pulled the rug from under 
some of the major commercial banks. By mid-1983 a number of banks 
had gone bankrupt, and Chile’s financial crisis was in full swing. At the 
end of the road, the massive bank bailout that followed cost the country 
(in present value terms) in excess of 20 percent of GDP. What makes this 
story fascinating is its parallel to the 1997-98  crises in Indonesia and Ko- 
rea. All the key elements are there: a rigid exchange rate policy, marked 
overvaluation,  a high current account deficit, reckless lending by  con- 
glomerate-controlled  banks,  poor bank supervision,  and a major  asset 
bubble. Perhaps more importantly, Korea, as Chile, had restrictions on 
capital mobility. In neither case, however, did these help to prevent the 
crisis. One cannot avoid thinking that, had watchers of East Asia studied 
the Chilean financial crisis of 1982, they would not have been so shocked 
by the turns of events in the Asian “tigers.” 
7.5  Conclusions 
The resurgence of capital inflows into Latin America has raised some 
important questions: Will there be another reversal? Are institutional in- 
vestors likely to behave in a herd fashion, as in the past? How vulnerable 
are the Latin American countries to a contagion effect coming out of East 
Asia or other emerging markets? The analysis presented in the preceding 
sections suggests that the conditions behind capital flows have changed. 
These appear to be less volatile that in the past, and investors are becom- 
ing increasingly sophisticated  and understand  that there are significant 
differences across regions and countries. However, the issue of vulnerabil- 
ity still remains. What makes the situation particularly difficult is that in 
many Latin American countries commercial banks-which  (ultimately) 
intermediate the capital inflows-continue  to be financially weak, even in 
the aftermath of the Mexican crisis. Moreover, in most nations supervi- 
sory systems are inefficient and unable to monitor effectively the quality 
of the portfolio and the extent to which banks indeed abide by  existing 
rules and regulations. 
Latin America’s own history justifies the current concern with banks’ 
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fail the effects of financial crises are greatly magnified. Past experiences in 
Chile and Mexico illustrate this point vividly. Banks were at the center of 
the Chilean crisis of 1982. After intermediating very large volumes of capi- 
tal inflows during 1978-80,  commercial banks had become increasingly 
vulnerable to negative shocks stemming from the international economy. 
In a similar way it is possible to argue that both the magnitude and tim- 
ing of the 1994 Mexican crisis were affected by the behavior of the bank- 
ing  system. Throughout  1994, as international  interest  rates  increased 
and Mexico was hit by a series of political shocks, the Mexican authori- 
ties made great efforts to maintain domestic (peso-denominated) interest 
rates at a relatively low level. A two-pronged approach was followed: On 
the one hand, a cap was imposed on peso-denominated interest rates; on 
the other,  the authorities  issued  increasingly large amounts of  dollar- 
denominated  securities-the  so-called tesobonos. The investment house 
J. P.  Morgan summarized this state of affairs in its newsletter of 22 July 
1994: “Half of the 28-day and 9 1-day Cetes [peso-denominated securities] 
were issued; the central bank would not accept the high yields required by 
the market to auction the full amount.” And on 23 July the Economist 
pointed out that “the central bank has also had to issue plenty of teso- 
bonos-dollar  linked securities that are popular with investors that worry 
about currency risk.” This strategy-which  in retrospect has mystified so 
many analysts-partially  responded to the Mexican authorities’ concerns 
regarding the financial health of Mexican banks. Their concerns had be- 
gun in late 1992, when a large increase in past-due loans became evident. 
In 1990, nonperforming loans were estimated to be only 2 percent of total 
loans; that ratio increased to 4.7 percent in 1992, to 7.3 percent in 1993, 
and to 8.3 percent at the end of the first quarter of  1994. With the fourth 
largest bank-Banca  Cremi-in  serious trouble, the authorities tried to 
buy additional time as they worked out an emergency plan. By the end of 
the first semester, the State Development Banks had developed a relief 
program based on some write-offs of commercial banks’ past-due interests 
and government-issued loan guarantees. In the belief that the peso was 
sustainable and that they had superior information, Mexican banks en- 
gaged in aggressive derivatives operations, accumulating  sizable dollar- 
denominated off-balance-sheet liabilities (Garber 1996). On 19 December 
1994, however, with the banks of Mexico having virtually run out of re- 
serves, the Mexican authorities decided to widen the exchange rate band. 
It was, however, too little, too late. In the months to come it became in- 
creasingly clear that a key element in the stabilization policy would be to 
contain the extent of the banking crisis. 244  Sebastian Edwards 
Data Appendix 
Data are from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS, various 
issues), unless otherwise indicated. 
Capital Inflows. Financial Account (line 78bjd, IFS) plus Net Errors and 
Omissions (line 78cad, IFS), for Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. Change 
in Total Reserves minus Gold (line 11  .d, IFS), for Chile and Colombia. 
Real Exchange Rate. Bilateral real exchange rate estimated using the nomi- 
nal exchange rate (line rf, IFS), the CPI (line 64, IFS), and the US Pro- 
ducer Price (line 63, IFS). 
Capital Controls. Calculated using the methodology in Valdes-Prieto and 
Soto (1996a). 
Domestic Credit. Line 32. IFS. 
Expected Devaluation. The fitted values from the estimated AR process of 
actual devaluation rate as explained in the text. 
Domestic Interest Rate. Deposit Rate (line 601, IFS). 
International Interest Rate. US Treasury Bill Rate (line 60c, IFS). 
Interest Rate DzfSerential. Domestic Interest Rate minus International In- 
terest Rate minus Expected Devaluation. 
Risk. Euromoney’s Country Risk Rating (several issues). 
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Comment  Jose De Gregorio 
Edwards’s paper is an interesting effort to discuss with rigor and empirical 
content capital movements in Latin  America  and the effects of capital 
controls. In these comments I will focus on the Chilean experience during 
the 1990s. As Edwards argues, “The . . . Chilean experience is particularly 
important since its practice of imposing reserve requirements  has been 
praised by a number of analysts, including senior staff of the multilateral 
institutions, as an effective and efficient way of reducing vulnerability as- 
sociated  with  capital flows volatility.” I  will  briefly discuss how  it  has 
worked. Then I will review the effects it has had on interest rates, the real ex- 
change rate, and debt structure. Then I will comment on some aspects of 
the Chilean experience usually ignored in the literature and finish with some 
lessons that can be drawn. 
The most important and well-known restriction applied in Chile is the 
unremunerated reserve requirement (URR, or encaje) introduced in June 
1991 and set to zero, but not eliminated, in late 1998. The Chilean case is 
interesting because the controls were applied in a period of massive in- 
flows, during which the country experienced very strong economic perfor- 
mance (see table 7C.1). Output and exports grew strongly. Savings and 
investment were also high by Chile’s historical standards. Finally, inflation 
declined and the fiscal position was strong. 
Chile has been a country characterized by widespread foreign exchange 
and capital controls. This was particularly important after the debt crisis, 
when many controls were put in place to prevent outflows and to secure 
external financing. In this context, with the surge of capital flows to emerg- 
ing markets in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the economy started opening 
up the capital account and easing many restrictions. For example, restric- 
tions on international investment by  pension funds, mutual funds, and 
other institutional investors had been relaxed. However, a minimum hold- 
ing period for foreign investment remained in place and the unremuner- 
ated reserve requirement was introduced. 
The specifics of the reserve requirement  have changed over time, but 
from 1992 to 1998 they basically imposed the obligation for most inflows 
to deposit 30 percent in the central bank.’ This deposit would not be re- 
munerated, resulting in a financial cost for the investor. In practice this 
works as a fixed cost of entry. Therefore, the longer the inflow stays in 
Chile the less the relative cost of this entry fee is. Hence, the URR penal- 
izes more short-term inflows compared to long-term inflows, since the for- 
Jose De Gregorio is professor at the Center for Applied Economics, Universidad de Chile. 
The author is very grateful to Rodrigo Valdes for very helpful discussions. 
1. For a description and discussion of the evidence, see Nadal de Simone and Sorsa (1999). 
For a recent assessment, see De Gregorio, Edwards, and Valdes (1998). Table 7C.1  Chile: Macroeconomic Indicators 
1987-97 
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  Average 
GDP growth (“h) 
Inflation (Dec.-Dec.) 
Fiscal surplusa (“h  GDP) 
Gross national saving (“h  GDP) 
Fixed investment (“h  real GDP) 
Current account (“A GDP) 
Quantum of exports (“h) 
Real exchange rate (86 = 100) 
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mer can spread the cost along a longer horizon.2 The minimum holding 
period for foreign investment is currently one year, and it was reduced 
from three years in 1995. This minimum holding period has barred many 
investment funds from investing in Chile because of regulations that do 
not allow them to invest in countries with this type of restriction. 
The URR was introduced with the purpose of allowing interest rates 
higher than those abroad, limiting the extent of capital inflows and the ap- 
preciation of the exchange rate (Zhaler 1998).’ Because the interest rate is 
the main instrument used to control aggregate demand and to reduce infla- 
tion, and because Chile is a country with a large exports base and a strong 
pro-export orientation, authorities thought that with the URR the objec- 
tives of remaining competitive and having high interest  rates could  be 
made compatible. So, the URR attempted to delink tight domestic mone- 
tary  policy, with an exchange rate objective, from monetary conditions 
abroad. This explains the evolution of the URR. First it was used only for 
bank credit. Then, as other forms of inflows exempted from the URR were 
taking advantage of high interest rates, authorities started extending this 
restriction to other capital inflows, such as portfolio investment. 
Therefore, a first evaluation  of the URR must look at its effects on 
interest rates and the real exchange rate. The evidence at this juncture is 
still controversial, but one can conclude that no strong effects on the real 
exchange rate have been found. There are some short-term effects, but 
they are small compared to the ex post evolution of Chile’s real exchange 
rate. Of course, it is always possible that the empirical work done until 
now  has  not  been  performed  properly.  However,  during  the  period 
1990-97  the re41 exchange rate appreciated at an annual rate of about 4-5 
percent per year (see table 7C.1), and no theory could support the argu- 
ment that the URR could have prevented this from happening. 
Regarding real interest rates some effects have been found. For example, 
Edwards’s paper shows that despite the fact that the URR may affect the 
short-run response of interest rates, it does not appear to have long-run 
effects. Similarly, De Gregorio, Edwards, and Valdes (1998) also find in 
VARs that “transitory shocks” to the URR have “transitory” effects on 
the real interest rate. This is not surprising, since most fluctuations of the 
URR are due to changes in international interest rates; but the most impor- 
tant effect is a once-and-for-all impact on arbitrage conditions when the 
URR is introduced, and this effect could be permanent. The fixed cost of 
entry generates an option value of investing and liquidating that invest- 
ment in Chile, which could reduce the direct cost of the fee. Indeed, Her- 
2. Calculations by De Gregorio, Edwards, and Valdes (1998) indicate that for a London 
Inter-Bank Offering Rate (LIBOR) of  6 percent, the URR is equivalent to an additional 
annual financial cost of 23 percent for operations at the one-month holding period, 8 percent 
at three months, and 1 percent at two years. 
3. See also De Gregorio 1997. 250  Sebastian Edwards 
rera and Valdes (1997) made this point and they have shown that the URR 
could support at most interest rate differentials between 1 and 2 percent. 
If the authorities overestimated its effect, they could have increased inter- 
est rates beyond the cost of the URR inducing more capital inflows. 
Another objective for the URR, which began to be emphasized some 
time after its introduction, was to “discourage hot money.” Official decla- 
rations were that Chile was very open, and opening up, to all long-term 
investment, but that it was not interested in short-term “speculative in- 
flows.” This was an important objective, but its importance has changed 
over time. For example, when the URR was reduced to zero in 1998 it was 
done to stimulate inflows and to defend the currency from depreciating. 
Whether capital inflows in 1998-99  are speculative or not, it is no longer 
an issue. 
There is no evidence that the URR would have reduced the magnitude 
of capital inflows. But there is strong evidence that shows that the URR 
has changed  the maturity  structure of Chile’s external  debt, tilting the 
composition toward longer maturities. A cursory look at the evidence con- 
firms this conclusion. In table 7C.2 it can be observed that there has been 
a sharp decline in the share of short-term debt. There has been some dis- 
cussion about the central bank figures, since the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) reports that Chile’s share of short-term debt is much 
higher than is shown by official figures (see Eichengreen et al. 1998). But 
a look at BIS figures, which effectively show more short-term debt, reveals 
two facts that support the view that in Chile the maturity has tilted toward 
the longer term. First, the share of  Chile is one of the smallest among 
emerging markets, and second, it is the country with the smallest increase 
in the share of short-term debt among emerging markets during the 1990s 
(see De Gregorio, Edwards, and Valdes 1998). 
Therefore, one can argue that effectively the URR has lengthened the 
maturity of Chile’s external debt. However, when using Chile’s example to 
argue in favor of controls in other countries, several issues, often ignored 
in the discussion. have to be taken into account: 
0  The Chilean economy had strong fundamentals, solid public finances, 
an independent central bank, and a very open and competitive economy 
when the URR was introduced and applied. The international environ- 
ment was very positive and there were massive amounts of capital avail- 
able to be invested in emerging markets. All of that can explain the impres- 
sive performance achieved during 1990-97. Capital controls did not signal 
any problems in the economy. In fact, they may have signaled very strong 
conditions, which ultimately could have increased incentives for inflows 
(Cordella 1998). The lesson is that being heterodox when the economy is 
doing well and is attempting to smooth the boom is not the same as intro- 
ducing controls to stop an imminent crisis. Table 7C.2  External Debt (US$ millions) 
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997 
Total external debt  17,425  16,364  18,242  19,186  2 1,478  21,736  22,979  26,701 
Private  5,633  5,810  8,619  10,166  12,343  14,235  17,816  21,613 
Public  11,792  10,554  9,623  9,020  9,135  7,501  5,163  5,088 
Long and medium term  14,043  14,165  14,767  15,699  17,613  18,305  20,344  25,414 
Short term  3,382  2,199  3,475  3,487  3,865  3,43 1  2,635  1,287 
Short terdtotal (YO)  19.4  13.4  19.0  18.2  18.0  15.8  11.5  4.8 
Source: Central Bank. 252  Sebastian Edwards 
0  Capital flows play an important role so there are clear welfare losses. 
They provide financing in capital scarce countries. They allow consump- 
tion smoothing, especially in economies that are subject to strong volatil- 
ity of income, such as Chile because of the importance of copper. Some 
of these flows take the form of short-term capital. Restricting those flows 
has  clear  implications for welfare  losses as the extent  of consumption 
smoothing and investment is limited. 
0  There are other distortions that need to be taken into account when 
evaluating the URR. In Chile, small and medium-size firms without access 
to long-term international financing are the most affected by this restric- 
tion. Large firms that can borrow long term abroad can avoid the URR, 
while small and medium-size firms have to pay  high  domestic interest 
rates. Thus, the URR, despite being a market-based control, introduces 
an artificial distortion that makes domestic short-term borrowing vis-a- 
vis long-term foreign borrowing more expensive. 
0  Policy makers can rely too heavily on the URR under the mistaken 
belief that it is very efficient. Indeed, it is possible that they overstate their 
power in Chile. As argued above, some of the benefits expected when the 
URR was introduced, providing monetary autonomy, are limited. There- 
fore, financial policies may be implemented  under the assumption that 
they will not strongly affect the real exchange rate or capital inflows. 
The main effect capital controls have had in Chile is the lengthening of 
maturity of external debt. Vulnerability has been reduced since it is not 
necessary to roll over a significant part of external debt every quarter or 
year. However, its effects in allowing monetary independence and in pre- 
venting a steep appreciation are less clear. For this reason, and given the 
distortions that the URR generates, it does not seem necessary to extend 
it to all capital flows, as suggested by the need of monetary independence. 
It is advisable not to use the URR as an instrument to significantly in- 
crease interest  rates and avoid an appreciation. Its main function is to 
avoid liquidity problems by lengthening the maturity of foreign liabilities, 
in particular, external debt. Of course, the problem is that using the URR 
only on external debt may induce loopholes and short-term debt may take 
other forms to avoid paying the URR. However, these loopholes appear 
precisely when interest rates are very high, under the assumption that the 
economy is protected, which usually is not the case. Of course the URR 
is not the only instrument for avoiding liquidity problems. In particular, 
the URR does not help if liquidity problems arise domestically. For this 
reason  establishing tight  liquidity requirements  on the banking system, 
such as those applied in Argentina, may be an alternative to capital con- 
trols. In general, prudential supervision and sound regulation of the bank- 
ing system are a key to reducing vulnerability and avoiding the welfare 
costs of capital controls. Capital Flows, Real Exchange Rates, and Capital Controls  253 
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